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ALTHOUGH MY UNITS OF ANALYSIS in this essay are the major interior towns of what eventually came to be known as the Syrian Arab Republic, a familiar political culture existed throughout the eastern Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire, in Palestine and along the coast of what is today Lebanon. This political culture was distinctly urban and was shaped by a mixture of Ottoman administrative practices, local Arab traditions, and European intellectual and material influences. In Syria's case, independent rural politics on anything more than a local scale began in the post-World War II era, when the rural peoples, especially the compact religious minorities on the Syrian periphery-'Alawis in the rugged mountain districts of northwestern Syria and Druzes in the inhospitable hills southeast of Damascus-began their entrance onto the wider stage of national politics. ' The political configuration of the larger Syrian towns during the Ottoman period suggests two areas of political power: one was external in the guise of the Ottoman state, with its imperial capital at Istanbul, and included the provincial governors and imperial troops; the other was internal, filled by local groups possessing varying degrees of independent social and political influence and acting as intermediaries between the state and the urban populace. The Turkishspeaking governors sent out from Istanbul often were not familiar with the Arabic language and local customs and usually did not have sufficient military backing to exercise direct control in the provinces. Thus they had to rely on those local forces with independent influence in society. This Ottoman dependence on local hierarchies of power allowed a particular type of politics to emerge in the Arab provinces, which Albert Hourani has called a "politics of notables."2 In some important ways, this mode of urban politics was operative not only in Ottoman times,3 but also before, during the medieval period, and after, in the interwar years of the twentieth century, and even in the years immediately following World War 11.4 Historians have used versions of the notables paradigm5 to study the political configuration of the major towns, the rival factions that dominated them, the relations between notables and foreign rulers, and the role of notables (a'yan) in provincial administration, land control, production and trade, and religious organizations, including the Sufi (mystical) orders.6 The notables paradigm has been especially valuable in studying the emergence of Arab nationalism in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine and the most important political and intellectual leaders of that movement in its formative stages.7
To become and remain viable political actors, notables relied on a variety of vertical linkages both to dependent groups in the wider society below them and to their foreign governors or rulers above them, whether in the provincial capitals of Damascus and Aleppo or in Istanbul. To enhance their strength, notables also formed horizontal alliances, often of a temporary sort, with other notables. Factions of notables competed with one another for influence in society and with their foreign rulers. The material base of the notables' power and influence was frequently rooted in control of land or the land tax, urban real estate, local handicrafts, regional and long-distance trade, and pious trusts (awqaf). Some notables belonged to the ranking families of the religious establishment, while others derived power from their control of local military organizations.
If there is one characteristic that helped define the notables, it was their ability to act as intermediaries between government and local society. Political survival required a delicate balancing act. Notables could not appear to oppose the interests of the government, because they risked being deprived of their access to the ruler; nor could they jeopardize the interests of their local clientele, because they risked losing their independent influence and thus their usefulness to the ruler. Access and patronage were the code words of the politics of notables.
It was usual for local notables to defend the social and political order by supporting the government. But there were occasions on which they led movements against the government by mobilizing those popular forces from which they derived their independent influence. Such occasions arose when a particularly strong governor sought to dissolve the compact between himself and the local notables or when a weak governor could no longer maintain the stability that ensured the prosperity of the local leadership. Rarely, however, did urban notables aim to overthrow the system of rule. Rather, their actions were typically intended to preserve the delicate balance between government and society. The important point to emphasize is that the various political and social movements, revolts, and urban insurrections that occurred in Syria in the nineteenth century were more often restorative than revolutionary movements.8
Before the second half of the nineteenth century, urban leaders in Syria may have had similar aims, but they did not form a single sociological type; their social origins and the foundations of their wealth varied, as did their geographic distribution throughout the towns. Thus the sources of their independent influence were also varied. For purposes of discussion, the urban notables can be grouped into three kinds of leaders, differentiated from one another by their status group, the nature of their material resource bases, and their physical location in the towns. There were the leaders of the great Muslim religious families, including members of the ulama (those learned in the religious sciences) and the ashraf (claimants to descent from the Prophet Muhammad), who were the guardians of urban civilization and Islamic high culture;9 secular dignitaries, a category composed of merchants and tax farmers; and the aghas (commanders or chiefs) of the local Janissary garrisons.
The leading religious families were mainly concentrated in the ancient quarters of the old walled city, near the cathedral mosque and central bazaar, where they had strong ties to the traditional commercial activities of production and trade. By the later Middle Ages, the great religious families were often among the most prominent commercial families; hence their wealth came not only from their control of pious trusts but also from their control of production and trade, and, by the eighteenth century, from hereditary tax farms (malikane) around the towns. 10
The secular dignitaries were less easily differentiated from the ulama and the ashraf in terms of where they resided in the towns, and they were also a much more amorphous group whose influence depended almost exclusively on wealth, which, as Ruth Roded has suggested, was a "precarious base for prolonged prominence."" Unlike the other two status groups, they enjoyed neither inherited prestige nor independent military might.
The aghas commanded the local Janissary garrisons, which had permanently lodged on the outskirts of the towns by the eighteenth century. By contrast to the ulama, ashraf, and secular dignitaries, the aghas and their supporters resided outside the town walls in what amounted to suburbs. The Midan quarter to the south of the ancient town of Damascus and Bab al-Nayrab on the southeast of Aleppo were two such suburbs that supported local Janissary garrisons. They were far less homogeneous than the inner city quarters and were filled with a variety of socially marginal in-migrants-uprooted peasants and semisedentarized tribes who visited in the winter season, a variety of non-Arab ethnic groups, and the undifferentiated poor, who were akin to Louis Chevalier's classes dangereuses. None of these groups was especially welcome inside the town walls. 12 The aghas derived power in at least two ways: by protecting the marginal and disenfranchised people in their quarters and integrating them into their paramilitary organizations, and by dominating the grain and livestock trade that sustained urban life. Aghas could even hold cities ransom by controlling the supply of grain to the towns or by fixing grain prices. In such circumstances, there was bound to be tension between the town center and the suburbs.
The aghas were both feared and despised by the more cosmopolitan religious establishment, which considered them socially repugnant and their power dangerous. The ulama and ashraf often found themselves in a conflictual relationship with the aghas, although they might occasionally join forces against the Ottoman governor, especially if he was unusually ruthless or weak. The religious and mercantile leaders in the city center were more committed than the aghas to upholding the status quo, for they were the groups with a true stake in urban society. Because they had the most to lose, urban revolt was not their preferred mechanism of correcting the balance of power in the towns when that balance was destabilized, as it so often was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They employed more subtle kinds of pressures to achieve their ends.
It would be incorrect to suggest that before the mid-nineteenth century the notables (and aspiring notables) constituted a "class" in the sense of an economic and social formation that can be defined with respect to property or, more precisely, by its relations to the means of production and to the social position of its constituents. Classes may have existed in the Syrian towns, but "classes" are not meaningful units of analysis in this period; their lifespans were too short because their relations to the means of production and especially to property were For the religious establishment and the military chiefs in the Syrian towns to survive, they had to adapt to the changing political climate. They could no longer move as freely as they had between the state and society. Istanbul still needed local intermediaries but only those willing to identify themselves with the reinvigorated Ottoman state and its new policies. To achieve and retain local political influence, a notable now had to move into the modernized state institutions being set up in the provinces. Never before had notables in the towns been obliged to identify their interests so closely with the state or to distance themselves so far from their bases in local society. began to turn to the land as a more secure investment, and they wanted to own it outright.'8 In response to these economic changes, the Ottoman state created the legal framework for the establishment of private property rights, rights that the state institutionalized in a new land code.'9 Istanbul was conscious of the forces of change around the empire; the Turkish authorities realized they could not halt the gradual spread of private property, but they could regularize the empire's tax collection system on the land. Deeded property meant more efficiently taxed property, and increased tax revenues could help pay for Ottoman modernization schemes.
The gradual acquisition of private property rights by Syria's urban notables in the last decades of the Ottoman empire complemented already existing forms of landholding or land control with which these urban leaders had long been involved: the rights of usufruct (tasarruf) to state-owned lands (which were being regularized in this period), hereditary tax-farming, and control of pious trusts.20 Notable families that became well-situated in the provincial government were able to manipulate the new legal system and accumulate significant landholdings, regardless of type. Although notables may not have completely consolidated their position as a class of absentee landowners before World War I, by the 1870s (or even earlier) there developed inextricable ties between large-scale landownership and political power, ties that could be observed as late as the 1950s in Syria and elsewhere in the Arab world.
The merger between the different urban status groups would be sealed by intermarriage. The wealthy, cosmopolitan families of the city center, who were so closely tied to the religious institutions, found it difficult to break with the past and move into the modernized bureaucracy established by the Ottoman state. By contrast, the military chiefs-cum-grain merchants in the peripheral quarters of the towns had less of a stake in the old order; and, powerless to resist a reinvigorated Ottoman state, they began to move deliberately into the administration. But, in towns such as Damascus and Aleppo, the great urban families of the city center possessed one thing that had always been desired by these social 18 The extent to which the general economy and, in particular, agriculture had become commercialized after mid-century varied from region to region. Reilly, for instance, suggests that "the economy of the Syrian interior was markedly less transformed than was that of the coastal regions, or was transformed considerably later"; "Status Groups and Propertyholding," 531. Also see Carol politics in Damascus in the first half of the nineteenth century, that is, before the merger. Based in the city center, with ties to the northern and western hinterland, one faction was pro-Ottoman and led by a family of secular dignitaries and former Ottoman provincial governors; the other was localist, incorporated greater numbers of the lower strata than did the city-center faction, and was led by the aghas of the Midan quarter, linked to the wheat-producing plains south of Damascus. The political economy of the period provides the key to understanding factionalism and the processes of political mobilization in Damascus. The first faction was supported by merchants engaged in the long-distance trade in luxury goods while the second faction was supported by merchants and artisans involved in local handicraft production and in the grain trade. The ability to adjust to changes and upheavals in the economy determined in large measure the relative strengths of each faction at different times.25 Because the ulama, ashraf, secular dignitaries, and aghas were hierarchically stratified and thus unable to acquire their own independent political identity, they fell prey to the struggles between the two main competing factions in Damascus.26
Long after the mid-nineteenth century, the intensity of urban political factionalism continued unabated. Members of the urban political elite evidently felt no obligation to close their ranks and clarify their common interests as a class on crucial political issues, because, until World War II, the Syrian urban leadership did not face serious local challenges from further down the social scale to the exclusive position that it had carved out for itself at the summit of politics in Syria.27 It was not until the 1930s that the political elite began to sense a rising danger to its position from restless classes and forces further down in society. Only after Syria gained independence did this danger crystallize into organized movements to depose the veteran elite and break up the social bases of its power. The elite attempted to close ranks then, but it was too late.28
To sum up, by World War I, the major political movements in Syria were led by members of urban notable families who brought to them a certain style of political action and a common way of looking at the world that they had acquired in late Ottoman times. The character of political life could be defined by the relative uniformity and sophistication of political culture in the towns. The characteristics of the local upper class were strikingly similar. In the towns, this class was composed of a socially integrated network of families whose material resource base was built on large-scale landholdings and who furnished the high-ranking bureaucrats and top local politicians as well as cultural and religious leaders. 25 Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics, 27-59, passim. 26 Bodman has depicted the intensity of factionalism in Aleppo, Syria's other major urban center, in the early nineteenth century; Political Factions in Aleppo. 27 The larger implications of the shift in the internal balance of power created by changes in the political economy and by the reinvigoration of Ottoman provincial authority require much more systematic examination, especially the other channels developed to articulate popular interests and demands once the notables began to redefine their traditional role as intermediaries between state and society as their interests became increasingly identified with the Ottoman state. See Khoury, "Urban Notables Revisited," 222, 225-26. 28 In this sense, before the mid-twentieth century, the Syrian urban upper class was a "class in itself' but not a "class for itself." Hanna Batatu makes this very point in the case of Iraq in "Class Analysis and Iraqi Society," Arab Studies Quarterly, 1 (Summer 1979): 229-40.
Although the great urban families were of mixed ethnic stock-Arab, Turkish, and Kurdish-they were Arabic-speaking and belonged almost exclusively to the Sunni Muslim rite. The bonds of a common language and religion were strong enough to mitigate the potential for ethnic conflict within the class. Its qualitiesits nature, style, and political behavior-pointed to a high level of social and cultural homogeneity. In a sense, its domination of urban society was legitimized because a large proportion of the population in the towns-a population that, despite the dramatic changes of the era, was still very much attached to its traditional religious beliefs, cultural practices, and customs-identified the local upper class as the defenders of the faith and guardians of culture as well as the providers of vital goods and services. In brief, a fairly cohesive Sunni Muslim upper class in the towns not only patronized but also represented a predominantly Sunni Muslim population, providing it with its cultural and religious leaders who embodied and articulated its beliefs and enforced its code of moral 
Turk measures.34 This class also provided the Arabist movement with its most radicalized supporters.
Still another historian, David Commins, has suggested that Arabism's appeal before World War I also extended to a group of Muslim religious reformers in Damascus who shared with the Arab nationalist notables "a common political and social agenda." Moreover, while secular urban notables of the landowningbureaucratic class were engaged in a growing struggle for power and influence with more privileged members of their own class who were identified with Istanbul and the status quo, religious reformers influenced by Islamic modernist trends emanating from Cairo were also engaged in an ideological struggle with high-ranking members of the Muslim religious establishment tied to Istanbul and who supported the status quo.35 That some religious reformers supported Arab nationalist tendencies before World War I is yet another indication of the Arabist movement's appeal to more than an aggrieved group of secular notables with membership in the landowning-bureaucratic class.
By World War I, Arabism was rapidly becoming the ascendant political idea and movement of the times in Syria. Thus, during the war, when many notables began to jump from the sinking Ottoman ship, they grabbed, as they fell, the rope of Arab nationalism. They really had no other choice. It was this rope that enabled them to enter the interwar years with their political and social influence intact. A typical system of colonial finance was imposed. Revenues came from indirect taxes, especially customs revenues, and a high proportion of government expenditure was on security and defense, not agriculture, industry, health, or education. Even though, according to the League of Nations, the overseer of all mandates, France was not to be granted special economic and commercial privileges in Syria, in practice this was disregarded. To complicate matters, the Syrian currency was tied to the French franc, which meant untold misery for the Syrian people in the 1920s and again in the late 1930s, when the franc fluctuated widely.40 Syrians on a fixed income suffered most in these circumstances, in particular, bureaucrats and the wider intelligentsia-groups that could cause a foreign power all kinds of headaches when provoked.
FOR THE MOST PART, MEN IMPORTANT IN LOCAL AFFAIRS in the last years of the
The mandate system was not one of direct rule. The French, like the Turks before them, needed a partner in order to govern. For instance, the League of Nations obliged the mandatory power to prepare the Syrian people for independence; also, France's postwar economy was so fragile that it could no longer afford direct rule abroad. Nonetheless, the character of the new imperial authority differed significantly from the old: it was illegitimate and therefore unstable. Contributing to this instability of rule was the reality that the French did not have the resources to purchase loyalty on a large scale or to develop the Syrian economy either for the Syrians or for themselves. Syria was not resource-rich. Oil discoveries were insignificant, and cotton production faced a serious setback owing to America's world domination of cotton production and sales and to the development of synthetics in France and elsewhere. French monetary policies had disastrous financial repercussions. The devastation wrought by World War I, the debilitating reorientation forced on the Syrian economy by the partition of geographical Syria and the creation of distinct and separate mandatory regimes, and the continued erosion of Syrian industry by the spread of the European economy helped create and maintain a situation of high unemployment and inflation, which added to the political instability Syria faced in the interwar years.43 Then there were specific French policies that inflamed traditional sectarian conflict by distinctly favoring the minorities and by promoting a series of administratively isolated minority enclaves in the face of local nationalist efforts to unify Syria.44 The French threatened the Muslim majority by attempting to take over the organization of their institutions and debasing the symbols of their culture.
Above all, France ruled Syria with its eyes on its North African empire, not a focus that helped make a sound policy. Not only were many policies in Syria judged by their possible effects on North Africa, but the very categories by which Syria was understood were drawn from French experience there. These categories simply did not fit the Syrian situation. Syria under the mandate was not Morocco under the protectorate. The French could not create lasting stability by playing the minorities against the Sunni Muslim majority, the countryside against the towns, and local urban leaders against one another.45
The French viewed Arab nationalism as a force that had to be resisted before it spread to North Africa and infected the heart of the French empire. In the early years of the mandate, they thought they could destroy Arab nationalism outright. Their approach differed from the British approach in the Middle East in the sense that the British knew early on that Arab nationalism was a force that would not wither away. Nor did the British think they could crush it outright. Rather, they tried to cultivate Arab nationalism, especially its more moderate leaders, by tying their interests to British interests and by having them contain, with discreet British encouragement, more radical Arab nationalists. Their method was particularly successful in Iraq during the interwar years, though less so in Palestine. By the time the French understood the advantages of the British method, it was already too late. The interwar years in Syria were pivotal in the sense that the country was uncomfortably suspended between four centuries of Ottoman rule and national independence. Nonetheless, politics continued to be organized much as it had been when Istanbul was Syria's overlord. Now, however, Syria's urban leadership was obliged to create a new balance of power between itself and the French. The notables-many of them newly grouped into an array of nationalist organizations and connected from town to town-still sought to rally the active forces of Syrian society behind their respective bloc or party; they still aimed to neutralize all local rivals; and they still wanted to appear as the sole figures of influence whose cooperation the French would have to gain in order to govern Syria.47 The French, like the Ottomans before them, had to govern in association with groups from the urban upper classes. But, given the intrinsic illegitimacy of France's position and its penchant for dictatorial policy without regard for the position and interests of the local elite, many urban leaders became forces of opposition. They had to appear more as the spokesmen of the people in the halls of power than as agents of the French. To gain recognition from this strong-minded regime, they not only had to mobilize the popular forces in society but also had to seek broader political alliances than before between the different towns and regions, between the Sunni Muslim majority and the religious and ethnic minorities, and between themselves and like-minded Arab elites in the neighboring Arab territories of Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq.48 Hence, they required both a shared dedication of purpose and an ideology to express this new solidarity and drive. Nationalism provided the kind of ideological cohesion and emotional appeal that urban leaders needed to be politically effective between the wars. Urban leaders shaped nationalism into an instrument by which to create a more desirable balance between themselves and the French. And they molded their movement to suit the particular interests of their class. In their hands, nationalism never was a revolutionary idea with profound social content; rather, it was a means to win French recognition without upsetting the status quo. Nationalism remained a simplistic idea: in its romanticized vision of the Arab past, it appealed to the hearts and minds of a broad section of Syrian society. It was an attractive and compelling ideology, more so because it was able to capitalize on Islam's political misfortunes by absorbing the important component of religious solidarity. The very language of this brand of nationalism indicated its class foundations. Apart from the aim of independence, interwar nationalism incorporated the liberal bourgeois language of constitutionalism, parliamentary forms, and personal freedoms.49 Hardly a word was heard about economic and social justicethe last thing the nationalist landowners, still able to collect their generous rents from the ground, were interested in discussing.
Local politics was played out in the Syrian towns, where patronage systems cut through and deflected horizontal, class-based politics.50 For much of the interwar era, nationalist leaders concentrated on mobilizing merchants, popular religious leaders, quarter bosses, and the urban crowd in their respective towns on an intermittent basis against the mandate authorities. However, the character of patronage also began to change in the 1930s, both in class and spatial terms. The base of the nationalist movement gradually shifted away from the popular classes in the old quarters, where religious chiefs and local gang leaders had traditionally mobilized the street; it shifted toward the new institutions such as the modern secondary schools, the university, the modern professional societies of lawyers, doctors, and engineers, the emerging scouting and sporting clubs and paramilitary organizations, and the infant trade unions, located in the newer, modern districts of the towns where many notables had also begun to relocate their residences in this period. Although this transition was by no means complete at the end of the mandate, by the late 1930s it was clearly irreversible.
For the political leadership, nationalism was certainly a useful instrument by which to mobilize forces in order to convince the French to bargain with them. But it also had the potential to alienate the French completely and destroy the delicate balance between French rule and the nationalists. Thus when the local leadership appealed to nationalism and behind it to religious solidarity, they had to temper their appeal by acts of "political prudence."5' In fact, nationalists preferred to mobilize urban forces on a temporary basis, that is, only when these forces could be useful to the elite's specific short-term aims. Mass mobilization on anything like a permanent basis was something to be avoided at all cost. At times, the elite feared mobilizing the streets, the mosques, and the schoolyards even more than they feared the French. Mass mobilization could get out of control and backfire in the face of the nationalist leadership. For decades, the absentee landowning class and its politically active members had worked within a somewhat fragile but comfortable framework as they played out their factional politics; under French rule, they rightly feared that politics might break out of that framework. It did break out for nearly two years during the Great Revolt of 1925-1927, the most significant rebellion of the 1920s in the Arab world. This genuinely popular uprising among Druze peasants that spread to Damascus and beyond obliged nationalists to throw their weight behind the rebellion in order to hold onto their leadership. Although during the revolt they adopted the language of revolution and even some revolutionary tactics, they did so reluctantly, after more subtle and diplomatic efforts to bring about a relaxation of foreign control had failed. And, while their methods may have seemed revolutionary, their actual aim was to correct an unfavorable balance of power, not to break the yoke of French imperialism. 52 After two years, the revolt collapsed in the face of a reinforced French army of occupation, leaving the nationalist leadership in a much-weakened state. Although nationalists were relieved to drop armed confrontation as a strategy for gaining French recognition, their future hinged on French receptivity. Fortunately, the revolt's ferocity and duration had also convinced the French of the need to make some concession to the desire for self-government in Syria. This was an unforeseen opportunity for a defeated and demoralized nationalist leadership. They were able to adopt the more familiar tactics of periodic protest mixed with negotiation in an effort to restore the type of balance between foreign ruler and local leadership that had been operative in late Ottoman times.
The track to Syrian independence had now been cleared. Independence was not to be by popular struggle or revolt but by periodic protest coupled with diplomatic activity. In 1936, the nationalist leadership conducted a fifty-day general strike after several years of unsuccessfully trying to advance its aims of unity and independence. This was immediately followed by diplomacy in Paris that finally brought the nationalists into government for the first time and into a power-sharing relationship with the French. During World War II, the nationalists continued to conduct largely nonviolent strikes and demonstrations while they built a new set of delicate relationships, in this case with a third party, Britain, which during the war had come to hold the balance of power in Syria.53 The nationalists preferred this way of achieving independence. Their methods did not upset the status quo, and they enabled veteran nationalists to take control of government after the French were obliged to withdraw from Syria in 1946.
ALBERT HOURANI HAS OBSERVED THAT, with independence, "the conditions for use of the old kind of political expertise" in Syria disappeared. For the first time, veteran nationalists no longer had to put themselves forward as brokers between the Ottoman state and local society or as popular leaders in the face of an alien authority like the French. They were now the rulers of their own country. Also, for the first time, they were in a position to use the state bureaucracy as "a means of coercion." In order to govern, the rulers of Syria saw no need to promote new local intermediaries with influence in society, as the Ottoman Turks and French had done before them. The age of a "politics of notables" gave way to a new age and a different type of politics.54 But the old framework did not give way suddenly. The political leadership that had emerged in the nineteenth century from the urban absentee-landowning class did not immediately dissolve after generations of activity. It held on for nearly twenty years after independence.55
Still, from its first days in the driver's seat in Damascus, the Syrian leadership's prospects were bleak. Already during the interwar period, rapid population growth, an inflated cost of living, the collapse of many traditional industries, the spread of modern education to the middle classes, and a changing intellectual climate had produced tensions and dislocations in urban society that eventually required more sophisticated responses than a narrowly focused nationalism provided. Increasing numbers of people had begun to seek support outside the old framework of patronage. Modern ideological parties headed by a rising generation posed a challenge to the old political order and to the veteran elite's monopoly of the nationalist idea. Its leaders belonged to emerging professional classes and organizations, were educated either in the West or locally, and found the Ottoman political legacy alien. Unlike the nationalist notables, who had resigned themselves to working within the political and administrative system established by the French, this ascendant generation adopted a more revolutionary strategy for achieving independence and unity. In the era of Syrian independence, members of these new groups contributed to the demise of the old way of politics. Indeed, it might be argued that they brought an end to politics altogether in Syria.
In any case, with independence, something had changed. Profound structural changes in the economy and society begun during the world depression and accelerated during World War II unleashed new forces with new methods and aims, which weakened the old framework. The politics of notables was replaced by a politics of "bureaucracies,"56 but also by a politics of regionalism and, more 5 precisely, by a politics of the countryside, of rural forces struggling against more established urban groups for control of the cities and of government. As Hanna Batatu described it, "[R]ural people, driven by economic distress or lack of security, move into the main cities, settle in the outlying districts, enter before long into relations or forge common links with elements of the urban poor, who are themselves often earlier migrants from the countryside, and together they challenge the old established classes." But, "in sharp contrast to the outcome of urban-rural conflicts of past centuries, the country people clinched a more enduring, if unstable, victory by virtue of their deep penetration of the Syrian army," the army that the veteran elite had long snubbed.57
The urban leadership lost power in Syria because it failed to wed nationalism to state power. Hourani has written that "new political ideas-radical nationalism, social reform, and Islamic assertion-provided the channels through which other social groups could pursue their interests: the growing middle class of the cities, teachers and students, and the army officers, many of them of rural origin and destined in the end to destroy the basis of the social power of the old elite, their control of the land."58 These new forces demanded the right to open up and take an active part in a political process that had previously been closed to them.
The veteran leadership eventually found it impossible to exclude the newly radicalized intelligentsia and members of the compact minorities-Druzes, Isma'ilis, and especially 'Alawis-who came from peasant and lower-middle class origins and from the rural periphery and smaller towns. Nothing could prevent them from redefining their relations with one another and with the veteran elite in government. On the political level, these new forces gravitated toward modern political organizations-the Communists, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian Social Nationalist party, and the Baath party, which had begun to make their ascent in the years before independence. 59 With their more rigorous systems of ideas and sophisticated methods of organization, they criticized and challenged the veteran elite in several concrete ways: for failing to uphold the reigning idea of pan-Arab unity, for contributing to the Arab failure to save Palestine in 1948, and for retaining strong, compro-mising ties to the Western powers.60 These radicalized forces shifted the emphasis of nationalism to better accommodate the accelerated changes taking place in economy and society. The language of nationalism no longer emphasized constitutionalism, parliamentary forms, and personal freedoms but rather social and economic justice for the masses, neutralism in international politics, and, in the case of the eventually triumphant Baath party, pan-Arab unity. Nationalism stressed mass education, land reform, social welfare, and rapid industrialization, all of which were to be brought about by a strong, dynamic interventionist state, for the good of society. Government was to be "for the people, but not by the people."6' Hourani has written that "in this new age, the political struggle takes place on two levels. Those inside the system of government compete for favoured access to the ruler and control of important positions of power in administration. Those outside must aim at a total overthrow of the government, using the only method which seems likely to be effective: the armed forces."62 Control of the armed forces went to the rural people-members of the compact minorities-in particular, the 'Alawis, a dispossessed mountain and hill community armed with a strange, heterodox brand of Islam, who were fiercely tribal and, as Raymond Hinnebusch notes, "the most intense carriers of peasant grievances against the urban establishment."63 The French had encouraged them to join the army during the mandate; they saw the military as the one avenue for social advancement beyond the rural squalor and isolation in which they lived.64
Once the 'Alawis began to penetrate the military in significant numbers, they used their rural, regional, tribal, and religious solidarity to monopolize its levers of command. At first, they aligned themselves with rural Sunni Muslims in the armed forces to weaken Sunnis from the towns, who were in control of the army immediately after independence. Then the 'Alawis turned on their rural Sunni allies and the smaller minority communities such as the Druzes in the army.65 Finally, the 'Alawis fought out their own internal struggles, with the cleverest faction in the military winning out, the one headed by the current president of Syria, Hafiz al-Asad.66 That members of the veteran elite managed to retain influence in politics until the early 1960s suggests just how tenacious and resilient they were in the face of the growing radicalized movements in the military and in civilian society. But, in the end, they were swept aside. With their departure, an old way of political life disappeared in Syria.
Today, there are fewer and fewer reminders of the time when Syrian political culture and the urban notables were closely identified with one another. For the historian, perhaps the most vivid is the 'Azm Palace in the Suq Saruja quarter of Damascus, which had been the ancestral residence of an important branch of the leading notable family of the town for nearly two centuries. It is now home to Syria's national historical archives. Here, the historian can examine a partial but illuminating record of the achievements and failings of Syria's urban notables in some of the very rooms in which they planned their activities. Could there be a more appropriate place in which to reconstruct Syria's political past?
